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Abstract
In a changing transition economy, Chinese government regulations that adopt the 
relatively simple bright line rule formula are enforceable in practice. Taking the early 
reform-oriented policies of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as 
an example, we ﬁnd that the CSRC did not consider local enthusiasm for reform when 
allocating IPO resources because of the high enforcement costs involved. We also find 
that CSRC listed company regulations were enforced due to the lower costs involved 
in verifying regulatory violations, and that listed companies that completed the reform 
process were given priority in public reﬁnancing. We present empirical evidence supporting 
the theoretical basis for the hypotheses outlined above. We also conclude that companies 
that completed the reform process in 2005 were of signiﬁcantly higher quality and that 
the SEO regulation did not affect stock market efficiency. These findings enhance our 
understanding of the eﬃciency of government regulation in a transition economy.
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1. Introduction
In a modern market economy, government inﬂuence extends to almost all areas of 
social life. Government can not only influence a market economy through financial, 
monetary, and other forms of macro-policies, but also lay down the rules of the game 
in the ﬁeld of micro-enterprise development by such means as economic regulations. 
In economics, the state intervention principle of the “market defect theory” posits that 
government intervention has certain inevitability about it. A well-functioning market 
mechanism can put social resources to the most effective use. However, there is a 
need to give the market mechanism itself room to function in an orderly, competitive 
environment to ensure the economic eﬃciency of the system in which it operates. If 
the market mechanism has an inherent weakness that prevents it from establishing or 
maintaining the systemic environment in which it operates at a low cost, this indicates 
the presence of a market defect. If the market is operated according to laissez-faire 
principles, it will lead to unfairness or inefficiency. The government public welfare 
person hypothesis postulates that government represents the public interest and that 
government regulations are made in response to a public need. The genesis of regulations 
lies not only in imperfect competition, the non-equilibrium status of market operations 
and market deﬁciency, but also includes the need to prevent and correct undesirable 
market outcomes. Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) found that in the second half of the 19th 
century, when the American society was in a tumultuous state, because the impartiality 
of the legal system could not be guaranteed, government regulation had to deal with the 
challenges of an ever-changing economic environment to have any real eﬀect. It can be 
argued that regulation is more eﬃcient than the judiciary system in that regulators have 
a stronger incentive than judges to identify and deal with violations.1 
In a complex and changing environment, government performance is determined 
by politics, the economy, culture, and a number of other factors (La Porta et al., 1998). 
The question then becomes whether government regulation can be eﬀectively enforced. 
1 Taking into account the economic development seen in China’s transition to date, it may be necessary to 
strengthen government regulation from a structural perspective, but the loopholes and ﬂipside of government 
regulation must be settled promptly (Sun, 2004). China, in its period of economic transition, must go through 
the process of “market failure – government regulation”, and it is only after doing so that can establish a 
modern form of government regulation. Those who put forward ideas on future public policy for China 
should pay attention to the establishment of the government regulatory system, which is one of the public 
management system “modules,” thus strengthening the government’s control functions (Wang, 2004).
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Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) formulated a relatively simple “clear rule” (the “bright line 
rule”) that makes it possible to reduce implementation costs in the public and private 
spheres and that it is conducive to supervision by the regulatory agencies that set 
the rules. The “clear rules” used in many domains, such as in the legal system and in 
determining the legality of the actions of economic entities, are elaborate when viewed 
from the perspective of this rule (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2000). When the regulatory 
object is complex and “the clear rule” has not been followed, whether there are cost/
beneﬁt restraints, whether the regulators will enforce the regulation, or will do so at a 
discount, and whether the original intent of the regulator can be realized are all questions 
worthy of thorough investigation.
CSRC regulation over the course of the listed company SSSR process in China 
provides an excellent opportunity to test this theory2. The listed company SSSR process 
is a key step in the return to a stock market-based system and the optimization and 
advancement of a system originally intended to run along market lines; it is the result of 
the game equilibrium between the holders of tradable shares and non-tradable shares on 
issues such as separation reform plans and the correct market pricing. However, if the 
market is allowed to take the lead in setting its own parameters, the process is bound to 
be slow, which will aﬀect the pace of capital market reform and development. Because 
there is unlikely to be special legislation passed for the SSSR, the CSRC will elect to 
use its regulatory and supervisory powers to incentivize listed companies to complete 
the reform at an early date. Senior CSRC oﬃcials have indicated on many occasions 
in public that policy support will be given to ensure an active share reform process; 
that CSRC attention will be focused on key areas and key enterprises to promote work 
undertaken to further the reform process; that regions should promote the SSSR process 
actively and implement preferential policies at the right time; and that for companies 
which have already completed the reform process diﬀerent policies should be adopted to 
encourage them to use the capital market as a way of strengthening their operations.3 
After distinguishing between the diﬀerent levels of commitment made by the CSRC 
to individual regions and listed companies, we ﬁnd it is harder to commit on a local 
basis. Not only is the cost of information processing for local regulations higher, but 
there is a lack of clear regulatory rules. Under such conditions, regardless of whether the 
2 The split share structure refers to the existence of both tradable shares on the stock exchange and a large 
volume of non-tradable shares owned by the state and legally deﬁned entities in the Chinese capital market. 
This was a peculiar solution developed in the course of transforming China’s economic structure, and has led 
to ﬂaws in the capital market in terms of a distorted pricing mechanism, resource allocation ineﬃciency, and 
the invalidation of market price as an innate factor promoting eﬃciency. The split share structure has limited 
the power of substantial shareholders who lack common interests as the basis for corporate governance. On 
the whole, the split share structure has been a major counterforce against the opening up and long-term 
development of the capital market. 
3 The press conference on “China’s reform and development of capital markets,” which was held by the 
Information Oﬃce of the State Council on 29 June 2005; The CSRC analyzed “two laws” at a video conference 
held on 31 December 2005 and a CSRC press conference about “the issuance of securities in listed company 
management (draft)” held on 16 April 2006.
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CSRC maintains its commitment to regional reform, regions that implement the SSSR 
with more enthusiasm will get a greater share of IPO (initial public oﬀering) resources. 
On the other hand, because the power of the CSRC to regulate listed companies is 
explicit, companies that complete the reform process at an early stage will be given 
priority to use SEOs (seasoned equity offerings). Implementing regulatory policy 
involves relatively low costs and is easy to fulﬁll. While previous studies have shown 
that regulation can easily lead to opportunistic behavior (Stigler and Friedland, 1962; 
Stigler, 1971; Chung, 2002; Chen, Ye and Chen, 2003), there are certain features of the 
SSSR, such as its short timeframe and high level of intensity, as well as the features of 
the corresponding regulatory policy such as its transience and high proﬁle, that suggest 
the SSSR will not lead to opportunistic behavior among listed companies. These issues 
constitute the basis of our paper.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the institutional 
background and extant literature, outlines the theoretical analysis, and sets out our 
research hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample, variables, and descriptive statistics, 
and Section 4 establishes an empirical model used for empirical stability testing. We 
present our conclusions and the limitations of this study in Section 5.
2. Background, Literature Review, and Theoretical Analysis
The pattern of Chinese economic reform conforms to a government-directed model. 
This model has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, because the 
Chinese government is superior to other social organizations due to its greater level of 
authority, it will take a relatively shorter period of time to move from the old system 
to a new one (Zhu et al., 2005). However, in a country with a complex economic, 
cultural, and political background, the gap between expectation and reality is sometimes 
large. This phenomenon is often referred to as “the behavioral deviation” (Zhu et al., 
2005)4. The government often uses regulation to deal with this problem. Shleifer (2005) 
propose the enforcement theory, in which government regulation is simply the balance 
of the cost of government dictatorship and the cost of social dictatorship. Government 
regulation is vastly superior in controlling disorder. Regulators are more active in 
discovering violations, and are more diﬃcult to bribe than judges. Pistor and Xu (2002) 
consider that regulators can be appointed from a pool of experts. Such regulators may be 
driven to achieve social objectives in certain domains and to regulate the stock market to 
4 According to the reasoning given, behavioral deviations can be divided into two types: transitional behavioral 
deviations and ﬂawed behavioral deviations. The former type is caused by transitional policy. For example, in 
the initial period of economic reform, some managers used their powers to carry on arbitrage. Another example 
is the single big holder phenomenon arising due to the prohibition on trading state-owned shares and legal 
shares. Flawed behavioral deviations are caused by policy ﬂaws or the lag in spiritual development in society, as 
seen in violations, broken promises, fraud, etc.
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contribute to the realization of such goals. Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) pointed out that 
government quotas are more eﬀective than tax controls in realizing policy objectives. 
Although quotas limit certain aspects of behavior, the low investigation costs involved 
can increase the eﬀectiveness of policy and raise the eﬃciency of society as a whole.
In China, regulation also has advantages and disadvantages, and regulation brings 
certain costs. Regulatory agencies, in an eﬀort to exchange their powers for economic 
benefits, prefer to expend their powers on economic affairs, increase the volume of 
administrative examination projects (Li, 2005). Government regulation is a common 
route to reform in China. In spite of some negative eﬀects, government regulation also 
has positive eﬀects (Wang, 20045; Chen et al., 2008). Few changes have been seen in the 
government regulatory system since the Chinese economic reforms were initiated in the 
late 1970s. Chinese government regulatory organizations have consistently had a set of 
both control powers and management powers, giving rise to the epithet “comprehensive 
regulatory agency.” As one of the direct government agencies, the CRSC is not diﬀerent 
in this respect (Mao, 2007). Due to its concerns over the potential stock market 
disorder, the CSRC has used quantitative controls to regulate the IPO market. From 
1989 to 1998, the regulatory pattern was consistently one of “institutional approval”6 
(Chen et al., 2008). However, the detailed ways in which this system has been applied 
have diﬀered: in 1993-1995, the method applied was one of “overall quota controls, 
division of IPO opportunities”; in 1996-1998, a “total quota controls, limit on IPO 
applications” method was applied (Li, 2001). After 1998, the CSRC introduced an 
“examination committee,” marking a transition from the “institutional approval” system 
to one of “institutional registration.”7 The CSRC no longer used a quantitative target in 
principle, but any unused quota could be used in following years. Although the CSRC 
oﬃcially introduced an “approval system” in March 2001, it was not implemented in an 
eﬃcient manner. The CSRC has maintained consistent control over which companies 
are permitted to launch IPOs (Chen et al., 2008).
The power of the CSRC to determine which companies can launch IPOs or SEOs 
may have had a great inﬂuence on the SSSR. Every year, when determining the amount 
5 Taking the US as an example, in the 1990s, remarkable progress was made in government regulations on 
science, technology, and environmental protection. On average, income resulting from government regulations 
on environmental protection was between $16,500-1,358,000 million, and income derived from highway 
regulations was between $25,400-45,700 million. The income derived from these two areas outweighed the 
costs involved.
6 Under the institutional approval model, if a company wished to apply for an IPO, it first had to seek 
permission from the regional government or management department of the company concerned, according to 
its administrative relationship. The company could then submit the application to the local securities control 
section. If the application was passed at this stage, it was submitted to the CSRC with a speciﬁc IPO amount 
indicated and the documents were oﬃcially prepared. In the last step, the CSRC issued its ﬁnal examination 
opinion. If no problems were identiﬁed in the opinion, the IPO application was successful. 
7 Under the institutional registration model, companies satisfying the standards speciﬁed in the Company Law 
and Securities Law can make IPO applications and do not require government approval. The CSRC decides 
whether the application is accepted according to applicable provisions.
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of stock to be issued in the coming year, the CSRC, either openly or privately, is obliged 
to consider the issue of assigning IPO and SEO licenses to firms based in different 
locations. To the CSRC, exercising this power involves balancing local development 
concerns and following micro-level government policy. To regional governments, being 
awarded an IPO or SEO represents a major ﬁnancing opportunity that can be used to 
assist local development. Local governments have an incentive to promote the SSSR 
process. As a result, to promote the SSSR, the CSRC must and may utilize its control 
right nimbly, shift its pressure, and defend its prestige (Chen et al., 2008). In this way, 
the CSRC connects local government enthusiasm for the SSSR with the IPO and SEO 
resource allocation process. If listed companies drag their feet in implementing the 
SSSR, the CSRC is likely to reduce the number of IPO and SEO opportunities available 
in the region, and instead give opportunities to regions in which the SSSR is actively 
implemented. Government regulation comes in several main forms. It includes not only 
stable long-term policies, but also changeable temporary policies; it is not limited to 
prohibitive control, but also includes oﬀering incentives (such as beneﬁt pledges); and is 
not limited to support control, but also encompasses substitution control. In this paper, 
we view CSRC regulation as a temporary, changeable, incentivized, and substitutable 
form of control behavior.
The theoretical analysis presented above is consistent with CSRC policy. “Opinions of 
the CSRC, the National Capital Committee, the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank, 
and the Department of Commercial Aﬀairs about the SSSR” were issued on August 23, 
2005. This document pointed out that all parts of the State Council Department should 
strengthen their cooperation with each other to give impetus to the SSSR and maintain 
the smooth development of the stock market. It also noted that local governments 
should make great use of their comprehensive resources and strengthen their leadership 
to promote the SSSR. Companies that have completed the SSSR process are ﬁrst in line 
for an SEO. On April 16, 2006, a CSRC public relations spokesperson released policy 
guidance called “early reform, early proﬁt” at a press conference on “IPO management 
method (basic plan).” The same spokesperson said that to alleviate the pressure resulting 
from concentrating ﬁnancing activity on the stock market, companies would be unable 
to launch SEOs until six months after completing the SSSR process. In addition, IPOs 
would first be resumed in regions in which the market value of companies that had 
completed the SSSR process reached a certain proportion. Although there were certain 
differences between the CSRC’s pledge and the traditional regulatory approach, the 
new requirements announced had a tangible inﬂuence on regions and companies alike. 
Regions and companies that displayed diﬀering levels of enthusiasm were to be treated 
differently: regions in which SSSR tasks were completed quickly would be granted 
more IPO resources, and companies that completed the SSSR process at an early date 
would have a greater chance of securing SEOs. This type of control limits IPO and SEO 
activities, and at the same time oversees regions and companies in their SSSR activities 
and spurs them to speed up the SSSR process. In this sense, this form of regulatory 
control is no diﬀerent to traditional regulation. What’s more, this control can be seen as 
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a form of “substitution control”8. It involves a substitution of, rather than support for, 
the market. The ultimate aim of the SSSR is to deliver an eﬀective market mechanism 
that allows for long-term, smooth development of the stock market. However, if no 
active steps are taken and the market is left to develop of its own accord, it is likely to 
take a long time to develop. To quickly resolve the diﬃcult issues which have been part 
of the Chinese stock market for several years, the CSRC has eventually used a non-
market based method to “lure” companies.
In the SSSR context, the CSRC oﬀers two forms of incentive: IPO incentives and 
SEO incentives, both of which are valuable to regional governments and companies. 
Companies given an IPO or SEO opportunity will receive a great deal of money to 
assist corporate development. If a company develops its business, it is likely to create 
more job opportunities in the area and will pay more tax to the regional government. 
For these reasons, IPO and SEO incentives are highly treasured by local governments 
and companies, making it necessary to prioritize active promotion of the SSSR. On 
the other hand, these two incentives are not the same, and each has its own distinctive 
characteristics. First, for IPO incentives, the applicable provisions are not explicit. 
Two reform attempts were made before the current SSSR, indicating that the market 
discovery function of the CSRC was inadequate9.If there is a lack of simple, clear, and 
eﬀective rules, and exclusive reliance on the rule that “the market value of companies 
[that have completed the SSSR process] has reached a certain proportion”10, it is 
difficult for the CSRC to accurately assess the efforts made by a local government 
in implementing the SSSR11. On the other hand, it is also diﬃcult to determine the 
yardsticks on which the CSRC is inclined to focus. Should it use the number of IPOs 
in a region, the amount of capital raised in IPOs, the IPO growth rate in comparison 
with the historical rate or with other areas, and solely IPO or SEO criteria, or both? 
This lack of clarity in regional regulation may affect the utilization of the SSSR and 
the realization of its goals. Second, the authentication and examination procedure for 
IPO authorization is complex and can be inﬂuenced by various factors. As a result of 
the diﬀerences in economic development across regions and diﬀerences in growth rates 
8 In practice, the CSRC has two diﬀerent functions. First, the CSRC oversees the stock market. It must supervise 
the market to prevent the occurrence of illegal activities. This type of control can be seen as a form of “support 
control.” Second, the CSRC is responsible for examining IPOs and SEOs. This type of control has been called 
“vicarious control” (Chen et al., 2003).
9 The CSRC made two attempts to resolve the non-tradable share problem in 1999 and 2001, by rationing 
and selling state shares. However, neither of these two attempts was particularly successful. This problem has 
increasingly stymied the development of the stock market.
10 This standard is fuzzy and inaccurate, especially when one considers several companies with a huge market 
value. For example, CPCC (China Petroleum Chemical Corporation) accounts for 11.29% of the total 
market capitalization of listed companies. For this reason, it is clearly inappropriate to assess the SSSR speed of 
Beijing based on this standard alone. The CSRC may take into account the percentage of companies that have 
completed the SSSR process as a supplementary standard.
11 Hay et al. (1996) considered the simpliﬁcation violation discovery procedure and suggested that Russia use “the 
clear rule” in its legal reforms.
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across product and essential factor (such as ﬁnancial factor) markets, companies allowed 
to have IPO may not be concentrate in regions that actively promote the SSSR process. 
High information processing costs are likely to prevent the CSRC from regulating the 
market effectively. For these reasons, in determining which companies can have an 
IPO and which companies are allowed to have IPOs ﬁrst, it is diﬃcult for the CSRC 
to rely predominantly on the proportion rule12. If the CRSC relaxes its IPO standards 
excessively to speed up the SSSR process, the costs resulting from low-quality IPOs may 
be large. Third, the IPO incentive is indirect. Through the IPO incentive, the CSRC ﬁrst 
incentivizes local governments, which then encourage local companies to reform. An 
increase in the number of links in the system may result in lower eﬃciency and higher 
costs. If more companies are controlled by the central government rather than the local 
government, the situation may worsen and diﬃculties presented by regional incentives 
will increase. In comparison, the rules on SEO incentives are explicit. SEO incentives are 
targeted at listed companies. These companies are generally of higher quality, so the SEO 
examination procedure is simpler and faster. SEO incentives are more direct. It is easier 
for the CSRC both to appreciate the eﬀorts made by companies in the SSSR process and 
to meet its commitment. The CSRC can give more active companies a greater likelihood 
of SEOs. In short, while IPO incentives are “point-to-face” incentives, SEO incentives 
are “point-to-point” incentives. To compare the two, “point-to-face” incentives are 
fuzzier, whereas “point-to-point” incentives are clearer. More diﬃculties and costs are 
involved in “point-to-face” incentives, whereas “point-to-point” incentives can help 
reduce policy carrying costs. With “point-to-face” incentives, because it is diﬃcult for 
the CSRC to observe the eﬀorts of local governments, it is diﬃcult to reward them. In 
contrast, with “point-to-point” incentives, because it is easy for the CSRC to observe 
the eﬀorts of companies, it is easy to reward them. Therefore, to achieve the objective 
of completing the SSSR process as quickly as possible, the probability of the CSRC 
realizing its SOE incentive pledge is greater.
Because the CSRC is a government department, the SSSR is founded on the 
government's credit. To maintain this credit, CSRC has introduced several measures 
designed to prevent potential opportunistic behavior among listed companies. The 
requirement that SSSR companies pay satisfactory compensation for tradable shares is 
one of these measures13. Under this measure, low-quality companies which speed up 
the SSSR process to increase their chances of being given IPO opportunities will be 
restrained.
12 Take Beijing as an example. On May 24, 2006, the number of companies that had completed the SSSR process 
was 68, representing 80.95% of all Beijing listed companies. This percentage was the 7th highest among all 
provinces (cities). However, if ranked according to the percentage of market value represented by companies 
that had completed the SSSR process, Beijing came in last. By market value, only 38.06% of its companies had 
completed the SSSR process.
13 The compensation paid to tradable shareholders represents a large amount of money to the company. Generally 
speaking, high quality companies are in a position to pay a satisfactory amount of compensation at an earlier 
stage.
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Based on the above theoretical analysis, and considering both IPO and SEO 
restarts14, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 1: It is diﬃcult for the CSRC to carry out regional reform eﬀectively because 
of the high information processing and policy carrying costs involved.
Regions active in the SSSR process may not receive extra IPO support from the 
CSRC. When the CSRC allocates IPOs, several important factors are likely to be taken 
into account. The ﬁrst of these factors is the extent to which the region is economically 
developed and the degree of growth in the capital market. In areas that have experienced 
rapid economic development and a good degree of growth in the capital market, the 
quality of companies applying for IPOs may be better, and the number of companies 
meeting the requirements may be larger. The second factor is the number of listed 
companies in a region. To balance the pace of development across regions and promote 
undeveloped areas, the CSRC may give more IPO opportunities to these areas. The 
third factor inﬂuencing IPO allocation decisions may be where decision-making power 
resides. The CSRC may have less inﬂuence in areas that have a high level of political 
clout. These areas ﬁnd it easy to obtain IPO allocations, even if they have not been active 
in promoting the SSSR.
Further, we predict that:
Hypothesis 2: It is relatively straightforward for the CSRC to control the SEO process.
Companies that actively implement the SSSR are likely to have a greater chance of an 
SEO. When the CSRC allocates SEOs, several other factors may be important. The ﬁrst 
such factor is the level of compensation paid15. Good protection for tradable investors is 
an important safeguard of a smooth SSSR process. The current SSSR has an impact on 
the long-term development of China’s stock market and is observed from the top level 
down. The current SSSR also represents an important political task to the CSRC. For 
this reason, while completing the share reform promptly, the CSRC must ensure the 
SSSR is carried out smoothly. All else being equal, the higher the compensation ratio 
paid by a company, the better the level of protection aﬀorded to tradable investors. This 
last result is consistent with the CSRC’s goal. This suggests that companies that pay 
a higher compensation ratio are more likely to be oﬀered an SEO by the CSRC. The 
14 If the majority of companies complete the SSSR process, a time limit will be set. All IPO shares become 
tradable after this point in time.
15 Wu et al. (2008) found that the relation between institutional investor shareholdings and the compensation 
rate was negative. This suggests that institutional investors did not play a signiﬁcant role in protecting small 
shareholders. Jin et al. (2005) and Chen et al. (2008) found that there were institutional investor and major 
shareholder conspiracies in the SSSR. As a result, the greater the number of shares held by institutional 
investors, the lower compensation rate would be.
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second factor is company ownership. SOEs (state-owned enterprises) are owned by the 
government, one arm of which is the CSRC. As a result, SOEs may have a better chance 
of securing an SEO.
Our ﬁnal prediction is as follows:
Hypothesis 3: CSRC regulations on the SEO process may not reduce the eﬃciency of the 
stock market.
The timeframe for the current SSSR is short and the level of intensity is high. In this 
brief, centralized policy change, it may be diﬃcult for companies to take opportunistic 
countermeasures immediately. At the same time, the CSRC mechanism (the satisfactory 
compensation ratio policy) oﬀers an additional guarantee of SEO company quality.
3. Sample and Data Description
3.1. Sample
The data come mainly from the CCER economic and ﬁnancial research database of 
Peking University, with the remaining data collected manually. Following the oﬃcial 
launch of the listed company share reform, IPOs and reﬁnancing were suspended until 
June 19, 200616. Our sample period runs from April 29, 2005 to June 18, 2006. A total 
of 985 observations for companies that have completed the share reform process are 
available. 
We examine regional performance during the share reform process and the 
subsequent IPO resource gains made (over the period June 19, 2006 to December 
31, 2007) to verify whether the CSRC honored its commitment. We also observe the 
distribution of companies for which the CSRC had rejected listing applications.
3.2. Data Description
The information shown in Table 1 includes the distribution of companies that 
have completed the share reform process (Share Reform), IPO resources (IPO), and 
companies that have had listing applications rejected (IPO-REJECT)17.
16 China CAMC Engineering (002051) was ﬁrst listed on June 19, 2006 after re-opening of IPO. Beijing Hualian 
Hypermarket (600361) was ﬁrst reﬁnanced on May 18, 2006 after re-opening of SEO.
17 Both IPO and IPO-REJECT include the review link for IPO applicants.
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Table 1. Distributions of Share Reform, IPO, and IPO-REJECT
Panel A: Regional Distribution
Share Reform IPO IPO-REJECT
Region No. Percentage No. Percentage No. Percentage
Beijing 68 6.9 20 10.5 5 11.1
Tianjin 16 1.6 4 2.1 0 0
Hebei 27 2.7 2 1.1 1 2.2
Shanxi 20 2.0 2 1.1 1 2.2
Neimenggu 21 2.1 1 0.5 0 0
Liaoning 36 3.7 3 1.6 1 2.2
Jilin 18 1.8 1 0.5 1 2.2
Heilongjiang 12 1.2 0 0 0 0
Shanghai 116 11.8 11 5.8 0 0
Jiangsu 64 6.5 22 11.6 8 17.8
Zhejiang 68 6.9 29 15.3 4 8.9
Anhui 42 4.3 6 3.2 0 0
Fujian 27 2.7 7 3.7 0 0
Jiangxi 15 1.5 4 2.1 1 2.2
Shandong 54 5.5 13 6.8 2 4.4
Henan 28 2.8 5 2.6 2 4.4
Hubei 38 3.9 2 1.1 1 2.2
Hunan 24 2.4 5 2.6 2 4.4
Guangdong 117 11.9 35 18.4 10 22.2
Guangxi 14 1.4 3 1.6 1 2.2
Hainan 10 1.0 0 0 0 0
Chongqing 18 1.8 1 0.5 1 2.2
Sichuan 31 3.1 2 1.1 0 0
Guizhou 14 1.4 0 0 1 2.2
Yunnan 16 1.6 4 2.1 1 2.2
Xizang 4 0.4 0 0 0 0
Shaanxi 18 1.8 2 1.1 1 2.2
Gansu 11 1.1 2 1.1 0 0
Qinghai 5 0.5 1 0.5 0 0
Ningxia 9 0.9 0 0 0 0
Xinjiang 24 2.4 3 1.6 1 2.2
Total 985 100 190 100 45 100
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Panel B: Time Distribution
Share Reform IPO IPO-REJECT
Time No. Percentage No. Percentage No. Percentage
2005 408 41.4 0 0 0 0
2006 577 58.6 65 34.2 11 24.4
2007 0 0 125 65.8 34 75.6
Total 985 100 190 100 45 100
Table 1 shows that a number of companies in economically developed areas such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong have completed the share reform 
process. On the one hand, these areas have more listed companies than others. On the 
other hand, the pace of economic development in these regions may have aﬀected local 
enthusiasm and resulted in these companies being better prepared when required to 
implement the share reform. In addition, as cities that host stock exchanges, Shanghai 
and Guangdong may have been more enthusiastic about the share reform than other 
regions. We also ﬁnd that these areas were allocated greater IPO resources.
From the time distribution perspective, we ﬁnd that a greater number of listed companies 
implemented the share reform in 2006 than in the previous year. The CSRC regarded the 
share reform as its primary task in developing the capital market and strove to ensure that the 
reform was basically completed by the end of 2006. The number of companies that launched 
IPOs increased substantially in 2007. At the same time, more company applications were 
rejected because the CSRC did not relax the IPO eligibility criteria. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Share Reform, IPO, and IPO-REJECT
N Min Max Median Mean Std.
Share Reform 31 4 117 21 31.77 28.05
IPO 31 0 35 3 6.13 8.63
IPO-REJECT 31 0 10 1 1.45 2.34
Table 2 shows that an average of about 32 companies around the country completed the 
reform each year and that there were signiﬁcant regional diﬀerences. Fewer listed companies came 
from the central and western regions due to the relatively low level of economic development 
in these areas. In addition, because the CSRC prioritized the 11 key provinces (municipalities) 
in the course of the reform process, regional diﬀerences were unavoidable18. Each region had an 
average of 6 IPO companies. Due to the many factors involved, the geographical distribution of 
IPO resources was very uneven, ranging from 0 to 35 IPOs per region. Table 2 also shows that a 
maximum number of 10 applications were rejected in any one region.
18 On June 8, 2006, Shang Fulin, the CSRC Chairman, said that Chinese listed companies should strive to 
complete the reform before the end of the year and that the CSRC was bound to focus on the 11 key provinces 
(municipalities) to play a positive role in promoting economic growth in those areas. 
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Figure 1. Regional Distribution of IPO
Note:  IPO_GROW = (IPO1 - IPO0) / IPO0. To maintain consistency in our comparison, IPO0 is calculated for the 
period (2004.01.01-2005.06.07). If IPO0 is zero and IPO1 is not zero, then the IPO_GROW is measured as the 
highest value in the country.
Figure 2. Regional Distribution of IPO_REJECT
Note: IPO_REJECT = Rejected IPO/ (Rejected IPO + IPO), and is calculated for the period (June 18, 2006-December 
31, 2007). If both Rejected IPO and IPO are zero, then IPO_REJECT equals zero.
Figure 1 presents the number of companies in each region which implemented the 
reform and the IPO resources gained; on the whole, the trend is irrelevant. Although 
developed areas such as Guangdong and Jiangsu had greater access to IPO resources, 
their IPO growth was smaller. This indicates that the CSRC’s IPO policy did not favor 
reform-active areas, which actually experienced a substantial reduction in IPOs in 
comparison with the previous period. Figure 2 reports the regional distribution of IPO 
rejections. The rejection rate for applications made from reform-active areas did not fall, 
and there was no trend in the opposite direction.
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Table 3. Time Distribution of Share Reform and SEO
Time
Share Reform SEO
No. Percentage No. Percentage Percentage2
2005 408 41.4 124 65.26 30.39
2006 577 58.6 66 34.74 11.43
Total 985 100 190 100 19.29
Table 3 shows that 985 listed companies had completed the share reform and 190 
companies had been authorized to conduct an SEO by December 31, 2007. A higher 
proportion of companies (30%) that completed the reform process in 2005 obtained 
an SEO quota. In contrast, only 11% of the companies that completed the reform 
process in 2006 were authorized to launch SEOs. Re-opened reﬁnancing gave the capital 
market an opportunity to release the pressure that had built up, with companies that 
implemented the share reform earlier being given priority.
The odds of being granted IPO or SEO resources are aﬀected by many complicated 
factors. Taking all these factors into account would result in an extremely complex 
model. We therefore select a number of suitable variables that have crucial impacts on 
the issues we investigate. Table 4 gives the deﬁnitions for the main variables used in this 
paper.
Table 4. Deﬁnitions of Variables
Reform region variables
REGION_
ENTH Proportion of market value represented by companies that completed the reform by June 18, 2006
MARKET Market index taken from “Chinese Market Index- the report of regional relative progress” edited by Fan Gang
SCARE Reciprocal of the number of listed companies based in local regions on June 18, 2006
GDP_
GROW Average growth in regional GDP
POLITIC A dummy variable that equals 1 if the region has a central member of the Political Bureau; and 0 otherwise
Reform company variables
FIRM_
ENTH The natural logarithm of reform batch
CR Compensation rate
STATE A dummy variable that equals 1 if it is a state-owned enterprise; and 0 otherwise
AVEROA The average ROA over the previous 3 years
Note: The data on GDP-GROW for local regions are taken from the China Statistical Yearbook.
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Regional-enthusiasm is used as a direct measure of whether a region was motivated 
to complete the reform process at an early stage. After two successful pilot programs, 
all listed companies were required to start the reform process on September 9, 200519. 
We measure regional enthusiasm by the proportion of total market value represented 
by companies that completed the reform process, with a higher proportion indicating 
a higher degree of enthusiasm. The operating efficiency of the government and the 
ﬁnancial market and the level of competition were relatively high in such areas, and the 
rule of law was relatively strong. The CSRC gave priority to listed companies in these 
areas because of their contributions to a normally functioning capital market and the 
development and improvement of the market. This is also in keeping with the original 
intention of the CSRC. “Shell resource” is the definition used for listed companies. 
A shell resource should be homogeneous and the value of the shell should remain the 
same20. To achieve balanced development across regions, the CSRC tends to give certain 
quotas to areas in which only a few listed companies are based. Districts with higher 
political status may get more IPO resources. When we test Hypothesis 1, regional-
enthusiasm serves as the most important explanatory variable.
We note that the higher the level of enthusiasm for implementing the reform, the 
earlier the reform process was completed, and the smaller the batch of ﬁrms involved. 
The batches of ﬁrms that participated in the two pilot programs are deﬁned as -2 and 
-1, respectively. After the start of the overall reform process, the ﬁrst batch of companies 
to have completed the reform is deﬁned as 1, etc. Due to the existence of two pilot 
groups, we adjust the batches when calculating listed company enthusiasm: firm-
enthusiasm equals batch originally involved plus three. In the course of the share reform, 
institutional investors and non-tradable shares may have “conspired” against small and 
medium-sized shareholders. High compensation rates directly reﬂect companies’ eﬀorts 
to protect small and medium-sized investors. One of the reform principles applied by 
the CSRC is to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors, 
indicating that the compensation rates paid may have aﬀected the CSRC’s SEO resource 
allocation decisions. Applications made by state-owned companies may also have 
been accepted earlier. Proﬁtability is a prerequisite to an SEO: the more proﬁtable the 
company, the greater the chance of obtaining a quota. In examining the CSRC’s SEO 
policy, we regard ﬁrm-enthusiasm as the most important explanatory variable.
Table 5 lists the descriptive statistics for the other regression variables.
19 On September 9, 2005, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council issued “Notices about Managing the State-owned Shares of Listed Companies in the Share Reform,” 
which prompted Chinese listed companies to begin their preparations for the share reform. The CSRC then 
took measures designed to push forward the reform in an active, steady, and orderly manner.
20 A “shell resource” refers to the qualification of a listed company to be traded publicly. The value of a 
shell resource is reflected in the secondary market. Shell resources result from market regulations and are 
characterized by the IPO quota system. A shell resource is formed by the use of an IPO quota and successful 
listing. A shell resource has an actual market price after listing because it is tradable (Yang, 2003).  
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Other Variables
N Min Max Median Mean Std.
REGION_ENTH 31 0.410 1.000 0.800 0.787 0.140
MARKET 31 1.610 9.870 5.680 6.042 1.930
SCARE 31 0.010 0.130 0.030 0.381 0.029
GDP_GROW 31 0.120 0.319 0.180 0.194 0.045
FIRM_ENTH 985 0.000 3.760 3.045 2.745 0.813
STATE 985 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.676 0.468
CR 985 0.000 0.700 0.300 0.290 0.091
AVEROA 187 -0.082 0.187 0.046 0.048 0.039
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Test of CSRC’s IPO Policy
We use multivariate analysis to test whether a region’s higher level of enthusiasm for 
the reform process resulted in its gaining a bigger IPO quota. The OLS regression model 
to be estimated (Model 1) is speciﬁed as follows:
 IPO_GROW = a0 + a1 REGION_ENTH + a2MARKET + a3SCARE  
+ a4GDP_GROW + a5POLITIC + ea
Table 6. Pearson Correlation Table
IPO_GROW REGION_ENTH MARKET SCARE GDP_GROW POLITIC
IPO_GROW 1.000
REGION_ENTH -0.050 1.000
MARKET 0.274 -0.064 1.000
SCARE -0.025 0.046 -0.809*** 1.000
GDP_GROW 0.148 0.210 0.083 0.006 1.000
POLITIC 0.073 0.158 0.210 -0.355** -0.040 1.000
Notes: See Table 4 for variable deﬁnitions.
 ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels; 31 observations.
Table 6 shows that only the market index (MARKET) and the degree of shell 
resource scarcity (SCARE) variables had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence, and that the regression 
results are not aﬀected.
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Table 7. Regression for IPO Policy
Dependent Variables
IPO_GROW IPO_GROW1
Coeﬀ. T-stat. Coeﬀ. T-stat.
INTERCEPT -3.300 -1.564 -0.780 -0.637
REGION_ENTH -0.099 -0.533 -0.216 0.286
MARKET 0.750** 2.435 0.324 0.335
SCARE 0.655** 2.021 0.442 0.214
GDP_GROW 0.113 0.618 0.043 0.829
POLITIC 0.182 0.920 0.265 0.222
Adj R-sq 0.066 -0.067
N 31 31
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Table 7 shows that the distribution of IPO quotas was not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by 
regional enthusiasm. Supervising the various regions was complex and it was costly to 
control the implementation process. Because the CSRC found it diﬃcult to accurately 
assess the reform eﬀorts made in the various regions, it found it diﬃcult to deliver more 
IPO quotas to active areas. Regions with higher political status did not receive a higher 
quota, indicating that the inﬂuence of the CSRC in these regions had not diminished. 
To achieve balanced economic development across regions, the CSRC is inclined to 
allocate a reasonable quota to regions experiencing a scarcity of shell resources. At the 
same time, the CSRC’s focus on the level of regional market development and the legal 
environment in assessing IPO applications affected regional access to IPO resources. 
Our empirical results show that regions that displayed a higher level of enthusiasm for 
the reform did not receive higher IPO quotas than other regions, and that the CSRC did 
not enforce its reform regulation.
Taking into account the timeliness of policy commitments, we consider that the CSRC 
may have implemented its regulation a relatively short time after re-opening the IPO system. 
Because certain regions may have beneﬁted more than others in the ﬁrst few months, we 
narrow our study period to the IPO-GROW1 period, which runs from June 19, 2006 to 
December 31, 2006. However, our results show that the eﬀect of regional enthusiasm is still 
insigniﬁcant and the coeﬃcient is negative. Furthermore, we conclude that the CSRC’s IPO 
policy was only a symbolic call and that the policy was never implemented. 
Robustness Check
The eﬀect of the IPO policy can also be reﬂected in the amount of funds raised in the 
capital market. Listed companies that raise funds can expand their operations, thereby 
providing more employment opportunities and contributing more local tax revenue. We 
use the amount of funds raised by a company to measure IPO-GROW.
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Table 8. Robustness Check for IPO Policy (I)
Dependent Variables
IPO_GROW IPO_GROW1
Coeﬀ. T-stat. Coeﬀ. T-stat.
INTERCEPT -67.116 -0.498 -10.45 -0.350
REGION_ENTH -0.388** -2.167 -0.184 -0.972
MARKET 0.461 1.548 0.006 0.020
SCARE 0.552* 1.760 0.018 0.053
GDP_GROW 0.249 1.407 0.398** 2.125
POLITIC 0.314 1.646 0.228 1.130
Adj R-sq 0.128 0.026
N 31 31
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Table 8 shows that the level of enthusiasm for the reform in a region did not have an 
impact on the size of the IPO quota awarded. The results of our robustness test are in 
line with our previous test results.  
The main explanatory variable is regional enthusiasm, which is measured by the 
market value of the listed companies which had completed the share reform by June 18, 
2006. We use alternative variables to test the robustness of this result. Since the IPO 
application and approval stages took a certain amount of time, we adopt an alternative 
regional enthusiasm measure based on the market value of listed companies which had 
completed the share reform process by December 31, 2005. Table 9 presents the test 
results, which show that the CSRC did not give a higher IPO quota to reform-active 
areas.  
 
Table 9. Robustness Check for IPO Policy (II)
Dependent Variables
IPO_GROW IPO_GROW1
Coeﬀ. T-stat. Coeﬀ. T-stat.
INTERCEPT -4.134** -2.320 -1.598 -1.528
REGION_ENTH 2 -0.325* -1.697 -0.371* -1.794
MARKET 0.963*** 3.024 0.570 1.654
SCARE 0.786 2.460 0.577* 1.672
GDP_GROW 0.094 0.556 -0.000 -0.014
POLITIC 0.259 1.343 0.330 1.583
Adj R-sq 0.153 0.010
N 31 31
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Test of Rejected Companies
We use multivariate OLS regression Model 2 to test whether the CSRC considered 
regional enthusiasm for the reform process when examining IPO applications21:
IPO_REJECT = a0 + a1 REGION_ENTH + a2MARKET + a3REGION_OWN + 
a4GDP_GROW + a5POLITIC + ea
Table 10. Pearson Correlation Table
IPO_REJECT REGION_ENTH MARKET REGION_OWN GDP_GROW POLITIC
IPO_REJECT 1.000
REGION_ENTH 0.079 1.000
MARKET -0.069 -0.064 1.000
REGION_OWN -0.080 -0.069 -0.838*** 1.000
GDP_GROW 0.035 0.217 0.085 0.167 1.000
POLITIC 0.203 0.158 0.210 0.061 -0.044 1.000
Notes: See Table 4 for variable deﬁnitions.
 ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels; 31 observations.
Table 10 shows that only the market index (MARKET) and degree of IPO resources 
owned by areas (REGION_OWN) variables had a signiﬁcant impact. Developed areas 
gained more listings and the regression results are not aﬀected.
Table 11. Regression for IPO Rejected
Dependent Variables
IPO_REJECT IPO_REJECT1
Coeﬀ. T-stat. Coeﬀ. T-stat.
INTERCEPT 0.152 0.451 -0.135 -0.336
REGION_ENTH 0.025 0.124 0.197 0.956
MARKET -0.115 -0.308 -0.050 -0.133
REGION_OWN -0.004 -0.012 0.064 0.172
GDP_GROW 0.050 0.244 -0.019 -0.093
POLITIC 0.226 1.089 -0.034 -0.161
Adj R-sq -0.131 -0.155
N 31 31
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
21 The explanatory variables for Model 2 are the same as in Model 1 with the exception of REGION-OWN. Since the 
CSRC takes into account the number of listed companies based in the local region when reviewing applications, we 
adopt the REGION-OWN variable. REGION-OWN is measured by the number of listed companies based in the 
region as a proportion of the total number of listed companies in the Chinese capital market. 
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Table 11 reports that a high level of regional enthusiasm for the reform process 
did not reduce the likelihood of applications being rejected. Nor did market process, 
economic development level, or the number of listed companies affect the CSRC’s 
decision. When deciding whether to approve a listing application, the CSRC mainly 
considers the circumstances of the company, such as its ﬁnancial status and corporate 
governance. Thus, we conclude that active reform areas were not given favorable 
treatment by the CSRC.  
Taking into account the timeliness of IPO policy in the share reform, we consider 
that the CSRC may have tilted toward active regions. We therefore narrow the study 
window to the June 19, 2006 to December 31, 2006 period. Our regression results show 
that the pace of reform and the level of economic development did not signiﬁcantly 
aﬀect the adoption rate. The study window for IPO-REJECT1 runs from June 19, 2006 
to December 31, 2006.
Robustness Check
The main explanatory variable for the test model is regional enthusiasm, which is 
measured by the market value of the listed companies which had completed the share reform 
process by June 18, 2006. We use an alternative variable measured by the market value of 
the listed companies which had completed the reform by December 31, 2005 to test the 
robustness of our results. The study window for IPO-REJECT1 runs from June 19, 2006 to 
December 31, 2006. Table 12 shows that the test results are basically unchanged and that the 
success or otherwise of listing applications was not aﬀected by the pace of reform.   
Table 12. Robustness Check for IPO Rejected
Dependent Variables
IPO_REJECT IPO_REJECT1
Coeﬀ. T-stat. Coeﬀ. T-stat.
INTERCEPT 0.164 0.603 0.027 0.085
REGION_ENTH 2 0.045 0.207 0.21 0.962
MARKET -0.119 -0.320 -0.077 -0.204
REGION_OWN -0.019 -0.051 -0.009 -0.024
GDP_GROW 0.056 0.281 0.027 0.133
POLITIC 0.219 1.042 -0.049 -0.23
Adj R-sq -0.129 -0.154
N 31 31
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
The unit for the above test is an individual region. We adopt an alternative unit of 
measurement and conduct the logistic regression using the explanatory variable “IPO or 
not.” The results remain basically unchanged.
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4.2. Test of the CSRC’s SEO Policy
We use another multivariate OLS regression to test whether listed companies that 
actively implemented the share reform obtained SEO quotas. The OLS regression model 
to be estimated is speciﬁed as follows22:
 LogitSEO = b0 + b1FIRM_ENTH + b2CR + b3STATE + eb
SEO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the listed company was 
reﬁnanced, and 0 otherwise.
For companies that had been reﬁnanced, we use a duration model to test whether 
companies that completed the reform process at an earlier stage were more likely to be 
awarded an SEO quota earlier23.
 SEOi = c0 + c1FIRM_ENTH + c2CR + c3STATE + c4AVEROA + ec
SEO is a continuous variable in this equation. SEO is measured by the number of 
months from the date the reﬁnancing was opened to the date of the reﬁnancing.
Table 13. Pearson Correlation Table (I)
Logit SEO FIRM_ENTH CR STATE
Logit SEO 1.000
FIRM_ENTH -0.274*** 1.000
CR 0.020 -0.124*** 1.000
STATE -0.058* 0.142*** 0.0823*** 1.000
Notes: See Table 4 for variable deﬁnitions.
 ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels; 985 observations.
22 Obtaining data on rejected SEO applications gives us two better choices. Firstly, when testing whether 
applications made by companies active in the reform process were approved more readily, we are inclined to 
use the sample consisting of both rejected companies and approved companies. Secondly, even where listed 
companies met the minimum proﬁtability requirement for issuing additional shares, more proﬁtable companies 
may have been given priority to refinance. For these reasons, we should control for the effect of company 
proﬁtability if data on rejected companies and the year of rejection become available.
23 The 190 SEO companies in the sample include three listed financial companies: Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank (600000), Minsheng Bank (600016), and CITIC Securities (600030). Since the 
profitability of financial companies is calculated in a different manner, our test of profitability (AVEROA) 
excludes all three ﬁnancial companies in the SEO sample.
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Table 14. Pearson Correlation Table (II)
SEOi FIRM_ENTH CR STATE AVEROA
SEOi 1.000
FIRM_ENTH 0.334*** 1.000
CR -0.182** -0.190*** 1.000
STATE -0.045 0.197*** 0.035 1.000
AVEROA 0.023 -0.212*** 0.020 0.042 1.000
Notes: See Table 4 for variable deﬁnitions.
 ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels; 187 observations.
Tables 13 and 14 show that the probability of being reﬁnanced and the batch are 
significantly negatively correlated. At the same time, the time required for the SEO 
application and the batch have a signiﬁcantly positive correlation. The test results are in 
line with our hypotheses.
Table 15. Regression for SEO Policy
Dependent Variables
LogitSEO SEOi
Coeﬀ. T-stat. Coeﬀ. T-stat.
INTERCEPT 0.634* 4.003
FIRM_ENTH -0.751*** 62.638 0.263*** 9.074
CR -0.209 0.152 -1.212*** 7.959
STATE -0.076 0.182 -0.224 1.938
AVEROA 1.780 0.863
Max-rescaled R-sq 0.106
N 985 187
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Table 15 indicates that listed companies with a higher level of enthusiasm (smaller 
batch) needed less time to complete the reform and were able to secure an SEO quota 
more easily. Furthermore, the earlier the company completed the reform, the earlier it 
secured an SEO quota24. To qualify for a reﬁnancing, companies usually sought to speed 
up the reform process by paying a higher compensation rate. State-owned companies 
were able to obtain SEO resources more easily than private companies, although the 
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant.  
24 The share reform process was initiated on April 29, 2005 and the ﬁrst reﬁnancing was completed on May 
18, 2006. Companies had to wait for more than six months before reﬁnancing even if they had completed 
the reform process. Refinancing was postponed during this six-month period. Companies that completed 
the reform process later were able to secure an SEO quota earlier if the CSRC did not consider the level of 
enthusiasm for the reform process at all.
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Taking into account the timeliness of SEO policy commitments, we consider that 
the CSRC is likely to have enforced its regulation within a relatively short time after re-
opening an SEO. If a large number of listed companies completed the reform, the CSRC 
was bound to weaken the policy incentives available. For this reason, we divide the study 
period into two periods: period I (2005.04.29 - 2005.12.31), and period II (2006.01.01 
- 2006.06.18). Table 16 reports the test results.  
Table 16. Regression for SEO Policy (two periods)
Dependent Variables
Period I Period II
LogitSEO SEOi LogitSEO SEOi
Coeﬀ. Wald Coeﬀ. Wald Coeﬀ. Wald Coeﬀ. Wald 
INTERCEPT 0.083 0.047 5.885** 6.640
FIRM_ENTH -0.419*** 7.519 0.234* 3.386 -2.294*** 11.238 0.846 1.256
CR 0.245 0.158 -1.175*** 7.236 -2.204 2.453 -0.232 0.872
STATE -0.288 1.569 -0.216 1.236 0.188 0.378 -0.260 0.714
AVEROA 1.218 0.304 5.714 1.466
Max-rescaled R-sq 0.041 0.046
N 407 122 578 65
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
During period I, applications made by companies active in the reform process 
were readily approved. Earlier completion of the share reform process and a higher 
compensation rate ensured that listed companies secured an SEO quota at an earlier 
date. During period II, although applications made by companies active in the reform 
process were also readily approved, the date on which they qualiﬁed for reﬁnancing was 
not aﬀected by the reform completion date. As the reform process wore on, an increasing 
number of companies satisfied the conditions for SEOs. In allocating refinancing 
resources, the CSRC did not attach great importance to the level of enthusiasm for the 
reform.
Robustness Check
As noted above, the level of enthusiasm for the reform among listed companies is 
measured by the adjusted batch. We use the period the company took to complete the 
reform process as a sensitivity check25. The results are as follows:
25 This refers to the length of time from the completion of the share reform to the date of the SEO policy 
announcement, and is measured in months.
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Table 17. Robustness Check for SEO Policy
Dependent Variables
LogitSEO SEOi
Coeﬀ. Wald Coeﬀ. Wald 
INTERCEPT 0.613** 3.892
FIRM_ENTH -0.234*** 65.491 0.071*** 6.858
CR -0.212 0.145 -1.275*** 9.060
STATE -0.118 0.436 -0.199 1.545
AVEROA 1.541 0.651
Max-rescaled R-sq 0.118
N 985 190
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Table 18. Robustness Check for SEO Policy (two periods)
Dependent Variables
Period I Period II
LogitSEO SEOi LogitSEO SEOi
Coeﬀ. Wald Coeﬀ. Wald Coeﬀ. Wald Coeﬀ. Wald 
INTERCEPT 0.252 0.352 1.640 2.245
FIRM_ENTH -0.175*** 7.716 0.071 2.003 -0.299*** 10.532 0.083 0.682
CR 0.284 0.215 -1.223*** 8.033 -2.344* 2.737 -0.301 0.044
STATE -0.294 1.641 -0.198 1.025 0.194 0.407 -0.276 0.816
AVEROA 1.022 0.214 5.401 1.319
Max-rescaled R-sq 0.042 0.044
N 407 122 578 65
Note: ***, **, * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
In contrast with the results shown in Tables 15 and 16, the results shown in Tables 
17 and 18 are relatively stable. The reﬁnancing needs of companies that completed the 
reform process at an early date were met before those of others. Companies that paid 
a higher compensation rate gained access to SEOs at an early date. The results of our 
robustness checks support our hypotheses.  
Test of Quality of Reformed Company
The CSRC’s SEO policy gave a great reform incentive to listed companies. The 
previous test shows that companies that actively implemented the reform were given 
SEO quotas at an earlier date. Nevertheless, two important questions remain: did the 
CSRC’s SEO policy induce listed companies to engage in opportunistic behavior, and 
did some low-quality companies qualify for SEOs by accelerating the reform process? To 
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answer these questions, we compare the quality of listed companies before and after the 
share reform. 
The test results described above do not take into account whether average ROA over 
the previous three years aﬀected the length of time needed to gain an SEO quota. We 
examine the quality of listed companies in terms of discretionary accruals, the type of 
audit opinion received, and legal and regulatory violations. One of the major reasons 
companies receive non-standard audit opinions is poor corporate governance. A sound 
governance structure can reduce the likelihood that a listed company will receive a non-
standard audit opinion (Wang and Peng, 2007). Corporate law mandates that companies 
operate in a lawful manner and that board of directors, supervisors, and managers be 
honest and trustworthy. When a company is punished by the CSRC for a regulatory 
violation, it casts doubt on whether the company is operated in a normal manner and 
calls into question its quality.
We classify the 190 listed companies that reﬁnanced during the study period into 
four categories, A, B, C, and D, in terms of “completion time” and “implementation 
time.”  
 
Table 19. Classiﬁcation of Samples
2006 2007 Total
2005 A (41) B (83) 124
2006 C (10) D (56) 66
Total 51 139 190
Table 19 lists the speciﬁc classiﬁcations for the SEO sample. 124 companies which 
completed the reform process in 2005 secured SEOs, while only 66 companies were 
reﬁnanced in 2006. Companies that completed the reform process at an early stage were 
awarded more SEO quotas, a result that accords with “early reform-oriented policies.” 
To avoid excessive concentration of ﬁnancing pressure in the market and stabilize market 
expectations, only 41 companies implemented reﬁnancing in 2006, and 83 in 2007. 
Table 19 indicates that most of the companies which completed the share reform in 
2006 were awarded SEO quotas in 2007.  
Table 20. Test of Discretionary Accruals in the Previous Year
Company Type N Mean Median T Z
A 39 -0.003 0.014
0.658 0.608
C 9 -0.036 0.004
B 82 0.013 0.015
0.031 0.392
D 56 0.012 0.003
A+B 121 0.008 0.015
0.121 0.354
C+D 65 0.006 0.004
Share Reform
SEO
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Table 20 shows that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the earnings quality of 
companies which completed the reform process in 2005 and those that completed the 
reform process in 2006. 
Table 21. Distribution of Non-standard Audit Opinions and Penalty Cases
Non-standard Audit Opinions Penalty Cases
SEO-1 SEO-0 SEO-1 SEO-0
A 0 0 0 0
B 0 1 0 0
C 0 0 0 0
D 3 1 0 1
Table 21 presents the distributions of non-standard audit opinions and listed 
company penalty cases resulting from violations in the SEO year and the previous year. 
We are unable to conduct a Chi-square test due to small sample size; the statistics we 
give are descriptive.
Only one company which completed the reform process in 2005 was issued with a 
non-standard audit opinion. By comparison, 4 companies which completed the reform 
process in 2006 were issued with a non-standard audit opinion. Category A is the best 
in terms of audit opinions, because no company in this category was issued with a 
non-standard audit opinion in either the SEO year or the previous year. Category D is 
the worst in terms of corporate governance, with 4 companies being issued with non-
standard audit opinions.
The distribution of penalty cases shows that companies in categories A, B, and 
C were operated legitimately and properly over the previous three years. Only one 
company in category D was punished by the CSRC for failing to disclose important 
information in a timely manner. Both the audit opinion and penalty case data provide 
evidence consistent with the earnings quality data. There is no significant difference 
between the early reform companies and the companies that reformed at a later date.
Test of the Economic Consequences of the SEO Regulation
The CSRC enforced the SEO regulation among listed companies in the course of the 
share reform. Since the SEO regulation served as an arrangement, it may bring certain 
economic consequences. We also pay close attention to the impact of the regulation on 
the allocation of the following resources. 
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Table 22. Test of ROA in the SEO year
Company Type N Mean Median T Z
A 40 0.060 0.057
-0.819 0.000
C 9 0.086 0.046
B 82 0.073 0.066
-0.341 0.761
D 56 0.070 0.059
A+B 122 0.069 0.063
-0.467 0.504
C+D 65 0.073 0.058
First of all, we test for the ROA of listed companies in the SEO year. Table 22 reports 
proﬁtability among the four categories of ﬁrms. The average ROAs for companies which 
completed the reform process in 2005 and 2006 are 6.3% and 5.8%, respectively, with 
no significant difference between the two. Among the companies that implemented 
SEOs in 2006, the average ROA for category A ﬁrms was 6.0% and the average ROA for 
category C ﬁrms was 8.6%, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerence. Among the companies that 
implemented SEOs in 2007, the average ROA for category B ﬁrms was 7.3% and the 
average ROA for category D ﬁrms was 7.0%, with the diﬀerence remaining insigniﬁcant. 
These results show there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proﬁtability of companies in 
the early and late reform groups. 
Table 23. Test of Discretionary Accruals in the SEO year
Company Type N Mean Median T Z
A 40 0.004 0.001
-0.827 -0.891
C 9 0.046 0.038
B 82 0.019 0.002
-0.112 -0.585
D 56 0.020 0.007
A+B 122 0.014 0.002
-0.556 -0.954
C+D 65 0.023 0.023
We further examine discretionary accruals in the SEO year as an extra measure 
of listed company quality. The results shown in Table 23 indicate that there was no 
significant difference in discretionary accruals between early and late reformers. We 
conclude that the CSRC’s SEO regulation did not aﬀect resource allocation eﬃciency in 
the stock market.  
5. Conclusions and Limitations
In the context of the transitional economy of the Chinese mainland, we investigate 
the efficiency of different forms of government regulation. We find that when the 
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entity being regulated is complex and the regulation itself is implemented in the 
absence of explicit rules, regulation is ineﬀective, and that when the regulation is brief, 
concentrated, forceful, and highly focused, it does not necessarily induce the problem of 
opportunism.
Taking the CSRC regulations implemented among companies and across diﬀerent 
regions in the course of the share reform as an example, the complexity involved in 
implementing the share reform in different regions led to very high operating costs, 
and the CSRC did not have explicit criteria for assessing the level of enthusiasm with 
which different regions implemented the share reform. It was also difficult for local 
governments to assess to what extent the CSRC emphasized the reform. As a result, the 
CSRC did not take into account the enthusiasm shown by diﬀerent regions in allocating 
IPO quotas. These problems made the regulation redundant. The CSRC did not award 
higher IPO quotas to more passive areas. We also ﬁnd that corporations that completed 
the share reform process at an earlier stage secured reﬁnancing quotas more easily. The 
CSRC seems to have assessed the degree of devotion shown by individual corporations 
in the share reform. It delivered on its SEO policy commitment to listed corporations 
and implemented the regulation eﬀectively. Nor did the CSRC relax its standards when 
awarding SEO quotas to corporations that completed the share reform process earlier. 
The quality of corporations that completed the share reform was comparable to that 
of other ﬁrms, indicating that the CSRC regulation did not aﬀect the eﬃciency of the 
capital market. In the SEO year, the diﬀerence between the quality of corporations that 
completed the share reform earlier and later was not signiﬁcant.
This paper provides empirical evidence on the eﬃciency of government regulation 
implemented subject to diﬀerent constraints. Our study is helpful to understand the 
eﬃciency and limitations of government regulation in a transitional economy and in 
assessing how governments can improve the eﬀectiveness of their regulations. It is also 
of interest to accounting and ﬁnancial researchers in that a company’s accounting and 
ﬁnancial decisions can be inﬂuenced by government regulation at any time.
Our study has a number of limitations. First, our sample size is too small for an 
examination of the effect of CSRC IPO policy across regions. Due to our focus on 
regional activism in implementing the share reform, our regional sample is limited to the 
31 Chinese provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities. This may inﬂuence the 
robustness of our conclusions. Second, hidden regulatory policy may exist, which means 
that we may not have considered all applicable regulatory requirements. Third, while 
the beneﬁts of regulation are clear, the costs of regulation can sometimes be obscure. 
Although we do not ﬁnd that regulation induced opportunistic earnings management, 
this does not necessarily mean that the beneﬁts of regulation outweigh the costs. This is 
an issue that is outside the scope of this paper. These limitations should be addressed and 
resolved in future research.    
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